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Abstract: Market and accountability educational reforms have proliferated around the globe, along 
with high expectations of solving countries’ school quality deficits and inequities. In this paper I 
develop an analytical framework from a critical sociology angle for analyzing the effects of these 
policies within schools. First I discuss conceptually the configuration of this quasi-market schema 
and develop the notion of the ‘performing school’. Additionally, I study the effects of these policies 
within schools, based on a literature review of 130 papers, and focused particularly on a smaller 
body of critical sociology research (56 papers). The aim is not to produce a comprehensive overview 
of policy benefits and disadvantages, but to understand school transformations within the current 
policy scenario. Schools, in this context, are placed within a competition-based schema, where 
managers and teachers continuously have to compete, marketize and perform ‘successfully’ 
according to external criterion. These policies are not only changing school practices and triggering 
'secondary' effects, but, moreover, they are transforming school life, ethics and teaching profession 
subjectivities in complex and deeply-rooted ways. In this paper I attempt to challenge policy 
assumptions and a technocratic view of policy implementation, and invite readers to rethink the 
nature and consequences of these policy formulae.   
Keywords: school markets; accountability policies; performativity; critical sociology; literature 
review.  
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La escuela performativa: Los efectos de las políticas de mercado y de  
responsabilización con altas consecuencias   
Resumen: La introducción de políticas de mercado y de “responsabilización con altas 
consecuencias” en el sistema escolar han proliferado en distintos países, junto a la 
expectativa de resolver las desigualdades educativas y los déficit en la calidad escolar. En 
este artículo desarrollo un marco analítico desde la perspectiva teórica de la sociología 
crítica con el fin de analizar estas políticas y sus consecuencias. Primero discuto 
conceptualmente la configuración de este modelo de cuasi-mercado y desarrollo la noción 
de la "escuela performativa". Además, estudio los efectos de estas políticas al interior de la 
escuela en base a una revisión bibliográfica de 130 artículos, y me focalizo especialmente 
en un cuerpo más pequeño de investigación que se desarrolla desde la tradición de la 
sociología crítica (56 trabajos). El objetivo no es producir una descripción exhaustiva de 
los beneficios y las desventajas de la política, sino que entender las transformaciones de la 
escuela en el escenario de la política actual. Las escuelas, en este contexto, se sitúan dentro 
de un esquema basado en la competencia, donde los administradores y equipo docentes 
tienen que continuamente competir, “marketearse” y desempeñarse “exitosamente” de 
acuerdo a criterios externos. Estas políticas no sólo están cambiando las prácticas escolares 
y provocando “efectos secundarios”, pero más aún están transformando la vida cotidiana 
de la escuela, la ética de la gestión y las subjetividades de la profesión docente. En este 
trabajo cuestiono los supuestos de la política y la visión tecnocrática de su 
implementación, e invito a los lectores a reconsiderar su naturaleza y consecuencias. 
Palabras-clave: mercados escolares; políticas de responsabilización con altas 
consecuencias; performatividad; sociología crítica; revisión bibliográfica 
 
A escola performativa: Os efeitos das políticas de mercado e de responsabilização 
com altas consequências  
Resumo: A introdução de políticas de mercado e de "responsabilização de altas 
consequências" no sistema escolar têm proliferado em diferentes países, com a expectativa 
de atender as desigualdades educacionais e déficits na qualidade da escola. Neste artigo, 
fazo o desenvolvimento de um quadro analítico da perspectiva teórica da sociologia crítica, 
a fim de analisar essas políticas e suas conseqüências. Primeiro discuto conceitualmente a 
configuração deste modelo de quasi- mercado e desenvolvo a noção de "escola 
performativa". Além disso, estudo os efeitos dessas políticas dentro da escola basada numa 
revisão da literatura de 130 artigos, e particularmente me concentro num espaço menor da 
pesquisa desenvolvido a partir da tradição da sociologia crítica (56 pesquisas). O objetivo 
não é produzir uma descrição exaustiva das vantagens e desvantagens da política, mas 
entender a transformação da escola no cenário político atual. Escolas, neste contexto, 
estão localizados dentro de um esquema baseado na competição em que os gerentes de 
escolas e os professores devem continuamente competir", se introduzir no mercado " e 
trabalhar " com sucesso" de acordo com critérios externos. Essas políticas não estão 
somente mudando as práticas escolares e causando "efeitos colaterais", mas também estão 
transformando ainda mais a vida cotidiana da escola, a gestão da ética e a subjetividade da 
profissão docente . Neste artigo, questiono os pressupostos da política e a visão 
tecnocrática da sua implementação, e convido os leitores a reconsiderar a sua natureza e as 
consequências. 
Palavras-chave: mercados escolares; prestação de contas político com grandes 
consequências; performatividade; sociologia crítica; revisão de literatura. 
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Introduction 
In recent times educational policies have evolved in complex and sophisticated ways. The 
welfare state has declined as the unique provider and manager of a centralized and universal 
schooling system. In multiple ways, neoliberal policies have been implemented and combined, 
opening educational services up to the market, diversifying school providers, generating competition 
between the private and public sectors, and offering ‘free choice’ (and exit) to parents. Conversely, 
these devolving policies are fused with state centralization tactics, introducing, for instance, national 
standards, assessment systems and school rankings, which are tied to individual and institutional 
rewards and sanctions.  
The state distances itself from educational management and daily processes, as it becomes a 
contractor, target-setter, and performance monitor, demanding school accountability (Ball & 
Junemann, 2012). School management is devolved and ‘made private’, while school aims, standards 
and evaluations are centralized and nationalized, that is, ‘made public’. Thus, paradoxically, the state 
strategically steers national school priorities and outcomes, while policy discourses promise ‘free 
choice’, ‘school autonomy’ and ‘diversity’. This mixed policy configuration has been denominated in 
ways that attempt to capture its dual nature. For instance: ‘quasi-markets’ (Le Grand & Bartlett, 
1994; Levačić, 1995), ‘public-markets’ (Woods, Bagley, & Glatter, 1998), ‘controlled school markets’ 
(Bunar, 2010), the 'de/centralized model' (Falabella, 2007), and the ‘post-welfare model’ (Gewirtz, 
1996, 2002). 
In this paper I analyze these policy patterns in education and discuss their consequences on 
the basis of an overview of the literature, particularly focused on ‘critical sociology’ literature (see 
chart 1, appendix). The review involves a search of scientific papers indexed in the Web of Science 
and Scopus between 2002 and 2012. The selection criteria, in first place, were essays and empirical 
research related to the consequences of accountability policies (i.e., high-stake tests) and market 
policies within schools (hence, I do not address the debate about how these policies impact on school 
test results). In total, I reviewed 130 papers, 23 of which are policy analysis essays, 2 are meta-
analysis reviews, and the rest (109) are empirical research papers. Additionally, 20 key books (related 
to the authors of the papers) were reviewed, as well as research reports (8), and doctoral theses (2). 
The literature reviewed mainly referred to the United States and England as exemplary countries that 
have implemented these kinds of policies, although research findings also emerged from other 
countries, such as Australia, Chile, and New Zealand.  
In this paper I am particularly interested in developing an argument from a critical sociology 
angle, analyzing the effects of the ‘double pressure’ on schools from both accountability and market 
policies. The aim is not to offer a comprehensive review, hoping to assess the 
benefits/disadvantages of these policies. In effect, there are available reviews on the impact of 
market-oriented policies (Waslander, Pater, & van der Weide, 2010) and accountability policies 
(Anstorp, 2010). This paper focuses particularly on critical policy literature (56 papers and 12 books). 
This research perspective is particularly concerned with studying the relationships between 
neoliberalism, social structures, and the production of school discourses and subjectivities. It 
employs mostly qualitative data, and is strongly influenced by critical and post-structuralist theory, 
including those outlined by intellectuals such as Bourdieu, Foucault, and Gramsci. 
In brief, I argue that the market + state-accountability model configures the performing school, 
in which managers and teachers continuously have to compete, marketize and perform ‘successfully’ 
within a prevailing competition-led schema. Contrary to policymakers’ assumptions, I find that this 
model has not met the expected outcomes, such as encouraging continuous school improvement, 
diversification of educational provision, and increasing equity. The identified policy consequences 
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entail impoverished teaching practices, triggering of exam-oriented methods, the intensification of 
pupil segmentation and exclusion, stronger hierarchical school environments and managerial systems 
of control, and an increased management focus on school marketing and quick and visible solutions, 
leaving thorough and long-term changes aside.  
This paper not only offers an overview of these effects, but also contributes to the 
interpretation of the results. From a critical sociology perspective, these effects are not only concrete 
changes in school practices or 'undesired' or 'collateral' consequences that can be limited or 
discouraged by 'correct incentives'. The described mixed policy formula is changing the way 
schooling and teaching are understood and experienced. They involve an overall ethical transformation, 
as performance and competition become overriding purposes, marginalizing critical thinking, social 
inclusion values, and democratic principles.  
The paper is divided into four sections. Firstly, I develop an analysis of the prevailing policy 
configuration, addressing a post-welfare educational model and the multiple pressures and 
regulations under which the performing school operates. Secondly, I examine the research findings, 
referring to the effects of market and accountability policies within schools. Thirdly, I examine a 
conceptualization of the performing school in the new policy scenario, and finally, I present a summary 
of the paper and concluding thoughts.    
The Performing School in the Post-Welfare Era 
Educational reforms around the world have entailed the almost synchronous emergence of 
similar discourses and rationales.1 Although there are variations in policy at the local level, influenced 
by specific settings and country history, it is possible to identify shared trends.2 To varying degrees, 
market-logic has been introduced into the social provision of education, entailing public-private 
partnerships, self-managed schools, parental choice programs, and competing-fund systems (e.g., 
vouchers or per capita plan). Diverse entities from the public and private sector come into play, 
providing educational services and competing with each other in order to attract ‘clients’ and sell 
their services as a product in a market.  
At the same time, many countries have created new ways to maintain state power and 
regulation over a dispersed market network of public and private school managers. The state, for 
                                                
1 See, for example, Ball, 1998; Ball and Youdell, 2008; Burbules and Torres, 2000; Daun, 2004; Falabella, 
2007; Maroy, 2004; Whitty, Power, and Halpin, 1998; van Zanten, 2002. 
2 However, it is important to note that these are solely general policy trends; the combination of these policies 
and their aims, extensions and philosophies vary significantly between countries. So, for instance, countries 
such as Belgium, Holland, and Sweden have expanded parental choice policies with low levels of state 
curriculum standardization, while countries such as the United States have strongly emphasized high-stakes 
tests with slower expansion of the private sector (although charter schools have increased, encouraged by ‘No 
2 However, it is important to note that these are solely general policy trends; the combination of these policies 
and their aims, extensions and philosophies vary significantly between countries. So, for instance, countries 
such as Belgium, Holland, and Sweden have expanded parental choice policies with low levels of state 
curriculum standardization, while countries such as the United States have strongly emphasized high-stakes 
tests with slower expansion of the private sector (although charter schools have increased, encouraged by ‘No 
Child Left Behind’ and ‘Race to the Top’ policies). On the other hand, countries such as Chile, England, and 
New Zealand have heavily enhanced both market and accountability policies. Certainly, there are also 
countries where these policy trends have been applied very scantily, such as in Finland, France, and Portugal, 
or not fulfilled at all, as in the case of Cuba. 
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instance, controls national curriculum and standards, sets school targets, and delivers school 
assessments and inspections. Meticulous specifications of school processes and outputs are 
established, maintaining a bureaucratic and controlling state locus. Moreover, countries increasingly 
publish school rankings, offering apparently neutral and irrefutable information for parents. Schools 
and teachers are held accountable to the state for performance outcomes, and these results are 
linked to school dis/incentives, such as performance-based salaries, dismissal of school staff, or 
closure of schools. 
The meaning and role of schools dramatically change in this new market-accountability 
policy configuration. Schools are positioned in a ‘local competitive arena’, as Woods et al. (1998) call 
it, or among ‘local spaces of competitive interdependencies’ as conceptualized by Maroy (2009). In 
this setting, policy regulations are diversified, not only emanating from the central state, but also 
from the market, local state, and private sector. Institutions are continuously constrained by the 
threat of withdrawal of financial and staff resources if they do not attract students. Meanwhile, they 
are publicly watched, assessed, classified and ranked according to measurable and comparative state 
standards.  
Hence schools have a double task; to compete in order to attract parental preference and, at 
the same time, to compete in terms of state performance rankings in order to position themselves 
favorably in relation to other schools, in addition to delivering daily managerial-bureaucratic 
obligations required by the public and/or private sector (see Diagram 1). It is believed that this dual 
pressure, market + state, when added to external support (e.g., teacher training, curriculum 
materials, professional support), will enhance quality provision, and that low-performing schools will 
assumedly disappear because of low enrolment (‘natural selection’) or owing to state regulations and 
penalties.  
This configuration has given rise to the performing school, with the mission to constantly act 
and perform for others in order to compete, remain attractive, and position itself advantageously in 
the marketplace (Ball, 2001, 2003; Gleeson & Husbands, 2001). Under this model, an 
entrepreneurial rationale is injected into public educational service, placing cost-benefit analyses and 
‘quality measurable evidence’ at the center of schools’ attention.  
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This educational arrangement involves a complex policy nature that cannot be reduced to a 
market neoliberal hegemony. The prevailing reforms and discourses shift from a welfare model to a 
‘post-welfare model’ (Gewirtz, 1996, 2002), or from a ‘bureaucratic–professional’ scheme to a ‘post-
bureaucratic schema’ (Maroy, 2004, 2009; Vandenberghe, 1999). On one hand these new 
denominations are an attempt to express that education is still a welfare service and remains subject 
to state control and bureaucracies (laws, rules, decrees).3 However, on the other hand, these 
conceptualizations also indicate that the relationship between the state and schools has been 
transformed significantly. The state has changed its role from being a direct universal provider of 
education to being a school subsidizer and evaluator.  
                                                
3 In effect, school education is compulsory for all pupils, is mostly financed by the state, and it is a key arena 
for countries’ economic development and cultural formation, which makes the educational market unique in 
comparison with other markets. 
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This combined policy formula of market devolution and state governance has emerged as a 
common rationale for a variety of governments, interest groups and political parties, including right-
wing and ‘renewed’ left-wing policymakers. The underpinning rationale is not the idea of the state 
assuring welfare services for all in a homogeneous manner, nor a free market without any state 
intervention. Both the ‘state monopoly model’ and the ‘mean market’ schema are criticized. The 
prevailing policy discourse, instead, has suggested an ‘ideal balance’, referring to a ‘synergy’ between 
the market and the state, the public and the private, the local and the global (see, for example, 
Arregui et al., 2006; di Gropello, 2004; World Bank, 1995).  
It is a model that is assumed to maintain the benefits of the market, and, at the same time, 
create solutions for its failings through state interventions and regulations. Thus, on the one hand, 
the market schema is expected to encourage school diversity, parental free choice (in spite of 
housing location), efficiency, and individual ‘effort’ and responsibility. On the other hand, state 
regulations are equally seen to assure national quality standards, to offer public and standardized 
information about school quality, and to generate ‘positive action’ programs for those in 
disadvantaged positions. This is the ‘dualistic nature of the neoliberal project’, as Gordon and Whitty 
express it (1997, p. 455). 
These are shared policy trends, although certainly, according to specific local settings, there 
are different policy combinations and emphases among liberal market formulae and state 
performance-accountability tools, as well as welfare and universal policies. However, the common 
axis of a post-welfare model in education (what makes it different from a welfare model) is that the 
fusion of these policies places schools in a predominantly unstable and competition-led field. The 
aim of the policy schema is not to make all schools produce the same service and achieve the same 
benchmarks, but is rather the contrary; that is, to generate an ongoing system of differentiation and 
ranking in order to trigger competition and thus make the model work. This perspective assumes 
that a market + performance competition-based schema will motivate and put pressure on school 
professionals to provide a ‘good quality school’. These competition mechanisms are believed to be 
key driving forces for triggering continuous educational improvement.   
In this model, state governance or governmentality, in Foucault’s terms, modifies its power 
technologies from direct and centralized mechanisms to control in indirect and omnipresent ways 
(Foucault, 1991). In other words, there has been a move from ‘government control’ to ‘governance 
by results’ (Newman, 2001, 2005), also conceptualized as the ‘evaluative state’ (Neave, 1988), or 
‘governing by numbers’ (Ozga, 2011). The state shifts its efforts from supplying school inputs, 
prescription and interventions, to controlling measurable outcomes.  
This new setting does not imply that the state has weakened or diminished its power.4 The 
policy configuration makes evident that the neoliberal dream of a free and diverse market together 
with a minimal state has not existed in practice as, for instance, Friedman (1962), Chubb and Moe 
(1990), and Tooley (2000) have advocated.5 Instead, the state has preserved or even increased its 
power. As Newman (2001) argues, policies of privatization and devolution do not signify the 
‘hollowing–out’ of the state. Rather, the state takes on new forms of power and influence, related to 
governance and managerialism, attempting to ensure its control ‘at a distance’ over multiple 
                                                
4 Harvey (2005) provides evidence that, under neoliberal capitalism, the state has performed a key role in 
enhancing capital accumulation. In his words, the state is “actively interventionist in creating the 
infrastructure for a good business climate” (p. 72). Subsequently, the author emphasizes that the belief that 
neoliberalism leads to freedom, democracy and a reduced state is a false expectation. 
5 For instance, Tooley (2000) is critical about state standardization policies and claims that education should 
be ‘returned back’ to the private sector. Also, Chubb and Moe (1990) claim that ‘bureaucratic control’ should 
be ended along with any forms of state evaluations so schools can dedicate themselves ‘to please their clients’. 
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educational providers (such as the local state, the entrepreneurial sector, religious entities, NGOs, or 
individual owners).  
Clarke and Newman (1997) claim that the state has even expanded and deepened its 
discursive power within today’s dispersed networks, as it coordinates an extensive pool of public and 
private institutions. The state permeates civil society and non-state agents, such as the 
entrepreneurial sector, religious institutions and voluntary organizations. Consequently, devolution 
policies enable the state to increase and spread its control into new sectors, since new technologies 
of power are extended to a much larger segment of the society. As the authors state, the 
phenomenon of dispersion “engages more agencies and agents into the field of state power, 
empowering them through its delegatory mechanisms and subjecting them to processes of 
regulation, surveillance and evaluation” (p. 30). This is the exercise of ‘meta-governance’, since the 
state sets “the rules of the game within which networks operate and steers the overall process of 
coordination” (Newman, 2005, p. 6).  
In this setting there is a paradox. Neoliberalism offers a political rationale in which subjects 
appear as empowered ‘autonomous choosers’, ‘self-managers’ and ‘responsible’ for their decisions. 
Meanwhile, schools and teachers are constrained by state audits and judgments, market competition 
and managerial work. Consequently, even though schools are supposedly autonomous, they are 
driven by subtle, yet permanent, ways of control and regulation. So, in spite of devolution policies, 
educational institutions must be subject to external commands and constraints. As Peter et al. (2000) 
suggest, schools “will not only be governed but also, and more important, be self-governed. They will 
be self-governed because they believe that they are autonomous choosers” (p. 120). This form of 
control is the most economic and pervasive effect of governance on institutions and subjects.  
It is important to note that within this post-welfare model, involving market and 
accountability policies, the institutional responsibility of education shifts from the central state to the 
school. Therefore, the performing school has to demonstrate and account for good market attainments 
and state testing outcomes, yet in a constrained context over which it has little control and real 
autonomy; meanwhile, this policy setting obscures the responsibility of state policy and intervention. 
In the words of Whitty et al. (1998), this is ‘devolution of the blame’ (p. 113). Also, as Ball (1994) 
comments, “The state is left in the enviable position of having power without responsibility” (p. 81), 
while schools manage broad responsibilities with little power. This paradox is maybe the most 
stressful aspect of this policy setting, producing what Blackmore (1997) calls ‘institutional 
schizophrenia’.  
Policy Effects: Encountering the Expected Challenges? 
There have been heated debates about the benefits and implications of market and 
accountability policies in education. In this section, the analytical focus is on the consequences of 
these policies within schools, and therefore, how the performing school is practiced and experienced. I 
explore what, in the literature, has been called the living markets, developed by critical sociology-informed 
scholars, such as Gewirtz et al. (1995) and Lauder and Hughes et al. (1999). This concept suggests 
that educational markets do not function in predefined ways according to neoclassical dogmas. 
Markets are socially, economically, politically, and even emotionally imbricated in the social space in 
which they take place. Therefore, it is fundamental to study, in concrete and comprehensive 
manners, how educational markets and accountability policies work in practice.       
In this framework, core research questions arise within educational research concerning: 
how schools respond to market and accountability policies, the kinds of school practices that are 
commonly triggered by these policies, and whether or not these policies motivate schools to 
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improve the quality and equity of teaching and learning. In order to answer these questions, as 
explained previously, I mainly bring into account critical sociology literature, although when relevant I 
refer to other pieces of research that concur with similar findings (in the conclusions I attempt to 
make some distinctions between the literature). The literature reviewed is focused on in-depth 
qualitative studies and mixed-method research, looking at institutional practices that provide 
evidence of what happens ‘inside schools’ within a competition-based schema.  
In this section, the consequences discussed refer to: i) educational quality and diversity; ii) 
social justice; and iii) organizational school life and teachers. The research outcomes reviewed mostly 
elude to both market and accountability reforms; however, reference is also made to the specific 
consequences of each separate policy. 
Educational quality and innovation 
Relevant studies examine whether testing and standardization, parental choice and school 
privatization actually enhance educational quality, innovation and diversity. Lubienski (2009), 
looking at research from over 20 countries, yet focusing especially on the US, concludes that schools 
are not responding to incentives based on competition, as expected. Rather than innovating within 
classrooms, schools are reinforcing traditional and uniform practices. Changes are mainly found in 
marketing and management strategies, but not in improving teaching and learning processes. 
Moreover, schools fear innovation because of the risk of diminishing enrolment. Surprisingly, 
innovation and diversification occur when government intervention takes place, that is, not through 
competition and choice. In the words of the author:  
Based on evidence reviewed in this analysis, it appears that there is no direct causal 
relationship between leveraging quasi-market mechanisms of choice and competition 
in education and inducing educational innovation in the classroom. In fact, the very 
causal direction is in question in view of the fact that government intervention, rather 
than market forces, has often led to pedagogical and curricular innovation. (Lubienski, 
2009, p. 45) 
 
Extensive and insightful studies carried out in England by Gewirtz (1996, 2002) and a 
longitudinal study (Bagley, 2006; Woods et al., 1998) show that a market + accountability schema 
triggers a privileging of academic and traditional pedagogic regimes and the reinforcement of 
authoritarian styles of teaching and management, giving less prominence to personal and social care.6 
In Gewirtz’s (2002) words, schools are adopting “a more utilitarian, exam–oriented approach to 
teaching, with less emphasis on responding to the interests of the children, the cultivation of 
relationships and the process of learning, and more emphasis on learning outcomes” (p. 81, original 
emphasis).7 This occurs within an atmosphere that praises tested cognitive skills (mainly language, 
mathematics, and science), narrowing the meaning and aims of education. Meanwhile, qualitative 
                                                
6 The first research conducted by Woods et al. (1998) was based on school and parent responses in three local 
markets over three years. Ten years later, this research was followed up by further research, by Bagley (2006), 
in one of the three market areas. 
7 Gewirtz (1996) notes that a traditional approach is not only market-generated, but as she says “welfarism did 
enable pockets of progressivism to develop and thrive … what our evidence does indicate, however, is that 
post-welfarist structures and discourses have produced a climate which is extremely hostile to progressivism” 
(p.19). 
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processes and unmeasurable achievements are left aside. Subsequently, increased curricular 
uniformity and homogeneity occur, contrary to expected educational liberty and diversity. 
Researchers using different research approaches who have examined school responses to the 
American accountability policy ‘No Child Left Behind’ (NCLB) and ‘Race to the Top’ (R2T) 
converge with similar results. Extended and robust research prove that while these accountability 
policies may have produced positive effects in limited cases, they have broadly triggered ‘teaching to 
the test’ methods (see, for example, Booher-Jennings (2005), Firestone, Schorr, & Monfils, 2004; 
Hamilton et al., 2007; Linn, 2000; Looney, 2009; Popham, 2001, 2002; Menken, 2006; Stecher, 
2002). Test examinations tend to dominate daily teacher and student practices (especially in schools 
attending poor communities), leaving aside more progressive and creative teaching (Firestone et al., 
2004). Hence, for instance, teachers increasingly employ textbook-driven methods, drilling exercises, 
rote learning, and frequent assessments similar to standard examination formats. Also, teachers, in 
order to increase examination scores, reallocate time and resources, reduce non-assessed subjects, 
and coach students in test-taking skills.8  
Chile has one of the most deregulated educational schemas in the world, led by market-
oriented mechanisms (with a private sector that covers more than half of school enrolment).9 Since 
the late 1990s, a set of accountability policies have been introduced gradually (e.g., school rankings 
tests, teacher salary-performance-payment, and school sanctions for low performance).10 My own 
work in the country (Falabella, 2013), using case study methods in four public schools, confirms 
similar results. I find that accountability policies within an open market schema impoverish teaching 
practices, pushing them towards mechanical, repetitive, and directive methods, together with a kind 
of obsession for constant pupil assessment; while teachers leave aside creative, reflexive-thinking 
and enriching learning experiences. These policies have a saturating effect on school staff, and, as I 
have noted, “Boosting test outcomes occupies an overriding priority in individuals’ minds” (p. 279). 
Moreover, these kinds of policies stimulate an instrumental rationale, in which school actors tend to 
calculate their strategies and ‘teaching investments’ in order to attain the test-score targets.      
 In a following study (Falabella & Opazo, 2014), based on seven public and private schools, 
the authors conclude that the effects of accountability policies work differently depending on how 
institutions are positioned in the marketplace, the ‘school ethos’, and the type of policy 
interpretation and mediation delivered by the local government. As a result, schools perceive and 
respond to pressure variously, according to these factors. While advantaged schools hardly sense 
external pressure and are positively reinforced by them, schools with ‘alternative’ curriculum plans 
and, especially, disadvantaged schools serving poor areas, are in much greater tension between 
responding effectively to external demands and attending local necessities and collective projects. 
These two studies, together with other insightful pieces of research carried out in the 
country (Acuña, Assaél, Contreras, Peralta, 2014; Carrasco, 2010), show that teaching effects are 
particularly problematic in disadvantaged schools, which serve pupils with a greater range of learning 
                                                
8 Well-known US education intellectuals such as Darling-Hammond (2004, 2007, 2010), Hargreaves and 
Shirley (2009), Lipman (2004), MacBeath (2006, 2009), and Ravitch (2010), have also critically analyzed these 
policies, arguing that top-down curriculum prescriptions and high-stakes testing are inappropriate for 
promoting professional development, classroom quality, and attention to pupil diversity. 
9 Similar effects are also found in other countries around the globe, such as in Holland (Ehren, Machteld, & 
Swanborn, 2012), Australia (Klenowski & Wyatt-Smith 2012), Macau, (China) (Morrison and Tang 2002) and 
New Zealand (Thrupp 2013). 
10 Currently, the creation of a new institutional schema is taking place in the country, which is made up of a 
‘Quality Agency’ and a Superintendence of Education, responsible for setting standards and inspecting 
schools. 
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abilities11. Teaching-staff tend to speed-up pupils’ learning processes and have difficulties teaching 
and assessing pupil diversity. Test preparation demands work on the basis of abstract exercises, 
while it is precisely these pupils that require concrete learning tasks linked to meaningful and 
context-based situations. Carrasco notes, “reform is inspired by principles of homogenisation, 
standardisation, control, and targets, in cases where schools facing challenging circumstances actually 
need differentiation, more identification, flexibility, and contextualised responses” (p. 266).  
In relation to market effects among schools in particular, English and American research 
finds that schools spend more time, energy, and money on promotional and marketing activities 
(see, for example, Gewirtz, 2002; Lubienski, 2009; Whitty et al., 1998). Bagley (2006) shows that 
these efforts become more intense and sophisticated over time, with a more receptive response to 
parents, yet employing a stronger ‘consumerist style’.12 Subsequently, rather than concentrating on 
substantive teaching curriculum changes, school managers have intensified their focus on school 
reputation, image and use of symbols (e.g., performance results, school uniform, the school façade, 
marketing materials). 
Ball (2006) suggests that this market atmosphere “encourages organizations to become more 
and more concerned with their style, their image, their semiotics, with the way things are presented 
rather than with the way they actually work” (p. 12). This ‘semiotics shift’ cannot be reduced to 
adding more school propaganda. These shifting efforts and desires profoundly change head 
teachers’ and teachers’ lives and the way they understand and constitute themselves. It involves a 
concern with calculating and investing in easy and visible targets, practicing a ‘quick-fix mentality’, as 
Gewirtz (2002) notes, while paying less attention to real work (e.g., pupil needs, teachers’ pedagogical 
questioning, misbehavior concerns) and long-term aims.  
In sum, literature focused on inner changes in schools, triggered by market and 
accountability policies, shows that there is no conclusive evidence to prove the positive effects on 
educational quality and diversity. Whilst there may be specific positive results, such as more 
responsiveness towards parents or higher expectations for pupil academic achievements, these are 
limited in general. Meanwhile, there is a substantial body of research that identifies problematic 
consequences, such as: curriculum uniformity and reduction; intensification of academic and 
traditional pedagogical approaches; expanding employment of ‘teaching to the test’; major 
investment in school image, reputation, and quick and visible solutions, instead of profound and 
long-term changes.  
Furthermore, scholars, such as Ball (2006) and Gewirtz (2002), emphasized that these 
changes within schools do not only involve institutional and classroom practices, but in the ways 
individuals think of themselves and the school. Policies entail a discursive power, transforming the ways 
school actors constitute the ‘good’, the ‘desirable’ and the ‘failing’ school, teacher, and also student. 
For instance, test scores, parents’ school preferences, and official school quality classifications, 
represent the value of educational providers, working, in Foucault’s terms, as a regime of truth 
(Foucault, 1977). These prevailing discourses significantly impact school priorities, behaviors, 
meanings, and most importantly, individuals’ subjectivities; although they are undoubtedly not free 
of tensions, doubts, and resistance, as demonstrated by Ball and Olmedo (2012).  
 
                                                
11 In effect, Acuña et al. (2014) use the metaphor of “the sick body” for these kinds of schools, as policy 
places an alarm on the “illness”, understood as an isolated problem. Meanwhile, the conditions under which 
teachers work within these institutions and the inequities of the whole system are made invisible.   
12 The study, carried out in England, shows that school staffs are being more welcoming and attentive to 
families in general and are more responsive to parental concerns, such as safety and transport. However, it is 
argued that these are formal or superficial changes rather than substantive ones. 
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Social in/justice matters 
A second matter, and probably one of the most problematic matters of the market + 
accountability formula, is related to social justice issues. The key point is that the model is based on 
a competitive rationale, which accepts, and moreover, requires the existence of a hierarchical unequal 
field with institutions that are differently positioned. As Lazzarato (2012) explains, markets require 
the production and nourishing of inequity. In the author’s words: “only inequality has the capacity to 
sharpen appetites, instincts and minds, driving individuals to rivalries” (p. 117). School rankings are, 
for instance, a core policy technology that incarnate this policy ideology; schools are hierarchically 
ordered and thanks to these differences they are called upon to compete and supposedly improve. If 
all schools were to attain the same benchmark, the model would not work. Perpetual differentiation 
is the key source of competition and is thus necessary to make the market-performance project 
function.  
In terms of social justice matters, under a competition-based model a first policy 
consequence is that children and their families become strategic resources for school competition. 
Ball, Maguire, and Macrae (1998) call this phenomenon the ‘economy of student worth’. Schools 
attempt to shape their student social intake towards upper/middle class parents and more ‘able’ 
pupils, while excluding those ‘disruptive’ pupils coming from more underprivileged backgrounds. 
This has produced a ‘pupil commodification’. Rather than being seen as subjects with needs, 
interests and potentials, children are valued, recruited, selected and excluded according to their 
ability to produce positive school outcomes. As Gewirtz et al. (1995) write: “The emphasis seems 
increasingly to be not on what the school can do for the child but on what the child can do for the 
school” (p. 176).  
In effect, educational markets, based on a competitive schema with a standardized 
parameter, penalize schools that receive mixed ability pupils, and award those that exercise selective 
practices (‘cream skimming’). This practice turns out to be one of the most powerful contemporary 
school improvement strategies. Selective schools guarantee good test results and institutional 
reputation in a more efficient and rapid manner. On the other hand, unpopular schools attract the 
remaining, non-selected students. Consequently, researchers find that market environment 
exacerbates differences between schools on the basis of pupil class, race and ethnicity, but does not 
encourage diversity in terms of student intake, curriculum or pedagogy. As Whitty et al. (1998) claim, 
these policies reinforce “a vertical hierarchy of schooling types rather than producing the promised 
horizontal diversity” (p. 42). What predominate are not pedagogical divergences, but class, race, and 
test result differences, based on a homogenizing curriculum and comparative evaluations on a one-
dimensional scale.  
Basing his evidence on an analysis of school marketing materials in two US urban areas, 
Lubienski (2003) finds that schools employ subtle symbolic forms of institutional differentiation, 
targeting more ‘capable’ students coming from middle-class families. Hence, within a market-scheme 
model curriculum diversification and school innovations are too risky and costly, as Lubienski 
(2009) argues. So schools distinguish themselves through symbolic representations of social class 
designed to shape enrolment demographics into “a safer and more certain route to strengthening 
their market position” (Idem, p. 339).  
Other pieces of research have shown that segregation not only occurs among schools, but 
also within schools. Senior managers and teachers reproduce and intensify competition and selective 
policies within the microsphere of the school. Students, for instance, are habitually examined, sorted, 
publicly ranked and labeled. For example, Gewirtz (2002), and Broccolichi and van Zanten (2000), 
referring to England and France respectively, indicate that mixed pupil ability grouping has 
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diminished, and has been replaced by pupil ability grouping, along with courses for ‘gifted’ and 
‘talented pupils’. These school groupings disproportionately place minority groups and working class 
pupils in those groups classified as underachievers. This exclusionary strategy is used to concentrate 
efforts on enhancing school test outcomes in a more focused and directive manner, and as a way to 
attract upper/middle class parents to public schools with mixed social intake.   
Another phenomenon identified is that educational managers strategically classify and rank 
schools, classrooms or students in terms of the possibility of them succeeding on national tests and 
in educational markets in general. As Youdell (2004) suggests, in an atmosphere of competition and 
sense of scarcity, individuals constantly calculate where and when to invest in order to boost school 
performance.13 The author, based on ethnographic school research in England, finds that three 
groups are set within classrooms (named as the ‘educational triage’). This classification serves to 
decide the kind of investment and effort delivered in each group. The order is: the ‘safe cases’, that 
is, with high performance, non-urgent for investment; ‘underachievers’, that is, with borderline 
performance, suitable for investment; and those ‘without hope’, that is, with low performance, 
unsuitable for investment. Hence, school staff usually give priority to intermediate level achievers 
near the proficiency score, while giving less attention to those with learning difficulties, as well as 
those who attain state benchmarks. Similar results are also found in other pieces of research in Chile 
(Falabella, 2013), England (Gewirtz et al., 1995; Levačić 2001; Woods et al., 1998) and the United 
States (Hamilton et al., 2007; Vasquez & Darling-Hammond, 2008). Overall, these micro-policies 
show that individuals move towards calculative and strategic thinking in order to effectively increase 
their school’s market and performance advantage, while matters related to social commitment and 
equity are marginalized.    
The converging evidence outlined above refers to general policy effects that appear in the 
literature. Nevertheless, it is vital to take into account that schools act and experience educational 
markets in different ways according to their position in a hierarchical field. In effect, authors such as 
Ball and Maroy (2009), based on a mixed-method European comparative study, note that market 
pressure tends to reinforce institutional differences, offering pupils unequal experiences and learning 
opportunities. According to schools’ market positions, schools are likely to produce certain kinds of 
school ethos (although in complex and hybrid ways). So, whilst some schools carry out exclusionary 
practices within a challenging academic environment, other schools are designated to serve diverse 
pupil social intake and the most underprivileged sectors of the population, giving prominence to 
caring relationships with lower academic expectations.  
Research using case study methods, such as in Chile, Carrasco (2010); Falabella (2013); 
Sweden, Bunar (2010); England, Gewirtz (2002), Reay (1998), Woods and Levačić (2002), and 
Lupton (2005, 2006); France, van Zanten (2002); and New Zealand, Thrupp (1999, 2013), confirm 
that schools that do not control pupil intake, serving more mixed or underprivileged pupils, have 
greater difficulties and limitations for responding competitively, improving school attractiveness, and 
implementing innovative changes. These institutions experience the impact of contextual influences 
and market hierarchies, facing accumulated pupil learning, behavioral, and social problems, in 
addition to poor market reputation and stigmatization. Moreover, under a performance competing 
schema, schools serving poor communities are usually punished by state labels of ‘failure’, 
reinforcing their disadvantaged position, rather than being motivated to improve. Meanwhile, key 
school contextual features are neglected by state judgments and classifications, such as broader 
school inequities and pupil social and ethnic composition. Power and Frandji (2010) claim that these 
school labeling policies are an ‘injustice of misrecognition’.  
                                                
13 See also Gillborn and Youdell (2000). 
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In brief, the findings reviewed evidence that market and performance-accountability policies 
have not only failed to reduce inequities and social segmentation, but have even produced and 
intensified it. Schools placed within the market-oriented scenario tend to sort, select and exclude 
pupils as a core strategy for competing. Additionally, the effects of social inequity and segmentation 
among institutions reinforce schools’ advantaged or disadvantaged position in the marketplace and 
therefore reduce pupils’ educational opportunities.  
Organizational school life and teachers 
A third matter emerges from the literature review regarding the transformation of school 
organization, including heads’ management style, internal staff relationships, and teachers’ 
professional autonomy. In general terms, diverse pieces of research conclude that there is little 
evidence of more democratic relationships and redistributed power resulting from market-oriented 
reforms. On the contrary, scholars, such as Wrigley (2003), referring to the English system, point 
out that inspection, competition and public comparison policies are deeply undemocratic, entailing 
teacher surveillance, a low-trust culture and superficial school responses. Similarly, from the 
American context, Darling-Hammond (2004, 2007) claims that these policies are based on 
‘hierarchical accountability’ and reduce professional autonomy, creativity and community reflections 
and debates.14 Overall, the author states that the policy logic of the model is based on threat, rather 
than on professionalism, vocation, and moral responsibility. It reflects an overall deep distrust of 
those who work in schools and assumes that they will only perform satisfactorily due to ongoing 
potential punishments or rewards.  
Studies, such as Gewirtz (2002) and Reay (1998), examine the micro-politics within four 
London public schools positioned in the educational markets (based on parental free choice, per-
pupil funding, and league tables). These pieces of research show diminishing collaboration and 
socialization within school communities, while individualism, competition and fragmentation are 
enhanced among senior managers and teachers, and among departments. Staff relationships are 
predominantly vertical, with a growing division between teachers and senior staff. Gewirtz (1996) 
explains that accountability and market regimes produce ‘labor intensification’ and pressure schools 
to act quickly, in ‘responsive’ ways. This scenario mitigates teachers’ collective reflection and 
participation, exacerbating instrumental thinking and the division of labor among senior managers 
and teachers. Findings also demonstrate a shifting focus as school managers emphasize 
administration and financial aspects, and focus less on learning and teaching matters. Nonetheless, 
these are not straightforward changes. Gewirtz (2002) refers specifically to the stress and dilemmas 
head teachers have to face, caught between school social contexts (e.g., local demands, pupils’ needs, 
teachers’ views) and having to respond to market, performative targets and bureaucratic pressure.  
Additionally, studies have reported damaging effects on teacher identity and work in 
Australia (Klenowski & Wyatt-Smith, 2012), England (Ball, 2001, 2003; Elliot, 2001; Fielding, 2001) 
and the United States (Finnigan & Gross, 2007; Valli & Buese, 2007). It is argued by various scholars 
that these policies are leading towards stress, demotivation, de-skilling and loss of professional 
autonomy. Woods and Jeffrey (2002) developed a profound study based on in-depth interviews with 
English teachers and observations gleaned from national inspections (delivered by OFSTED15). The 
study concludes that inspection and standardization policies have produced feelings of insecurity 
                                                
14 Similarly Hargreaves and Shirley (2009) refer to the ‘soulless standardization’ reforms that push schools 
into ‘performing training sects’. 
15 Office for Standards in Education. 
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among teachers and a sense of powerlessness and moral decline, in addition to exhaustion, irritability 
and overwork. Moreover, the researchers provide evidence that the ‘technologization of teaching’ 
has fragmented and weakened teacher identity and motivation. Teachers perceive that these policies 
are producing less creative teaching jobs, reducing their skills, and deteriorating their vocation and 
the attractiveness of the profession. They also state that, previously, a holistic teaching approach, 
involving warm and caring relationships with pupils, meant core values tied to the meaning of their 
profession, yet they recognize that current pressures have led to a less emotional, sensitive and 
empathetic practices. This reconfiguration of teacher identity is described by the authors: 
The teacher’s personal identity in the new order is partial, fragmented, and inferior to 
that of the old in that teachers retain a sense of the ideal self, but it is no longer in 
teaching. The personal identity of work has become a situational one, designed to meet 
the instrumental purposes of audit accountability. Teachers’ real selves are held in 
reserve, to be realized in other situations outside school or in some different future 
within (p. 238). 
 
All in all, market and accountability policies are transforming school life and the teaching 
profession in complex and profound ways. Contrary to policy assumptions, these arrangements have 
not led to more empowered, creative and democratic organizations. The literature provides evidence 
of diminishing collaborative work and staff participation, along with an increase in the number of 
control systems and competition within schools, and heavier workloads for managers and teachers. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that research results show a ‘space of indeterminacy’, as Woods 
and Jeffery (2002) put it. School actors confront these policies in different ways, employing reactions 
and strategies of resignation, struggle, adjustment and negotiation, regarding personal ethics, school 
targets, and management pressures.      
The Performing School: An Ethical Transformation 
These identified policy effects are not merely changes in the daily routines of school 
managers and teachers, they are practiced and justified along with a profound ethical transformation 
of the way schooling is understood and experienced. As Gewirtz (2002) claims, “the market 
revolution is not just a change of structure and incentives. It is a transformational process that 
brings into play a new set of values and a new moral environment” (p. 47). This has entailed a shift 
from a comprehensive culture towards an instrumental efficiency rationale, concerned with 
individual competition, efficiency and performance indicators, over pedagogical criteria and issues of 
social justice matters. This atmosphere and institutional ethos is also conceptualized by Apple (2007) 
as the proliferation of an ‘audit culture’ that colonizes school life, shaping consumer-driven and 
overly-individualistic cultures, while eroding collective values and ‘thick’ democratic organizations.  
These transformations within schools show the pervasive and extensive effects of market 
and accountability policies. Following Foucault (1991), these policies function as governmentality 
tactics over dispersed public and private providers. Policy discourses and technologies steer 
institutional priorities and practices, penetrating into institutional daily life and individuals’ 
rationality, conducting their ‘freedom’ within a neoliberal era. As Rose (1992) notes, the most 
powerful effect of this kind of policy technology is that, rather than repressing individuals, it shapes 
‘political mentalities’.  
The prevailing model is a new mode of social and moral regulation, as Ball states (2001, 
2003), which outlines a new practice oriented towards performativity. The author states that, 
“Performativity is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation, or even a system of ‘terror’, in 
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Lyotard´s words, that employs judgments, comparisons and displays as means of control, attrition 
and change.” (Ball, 2001, p. 210). Performativity occurs when individuals or organizations focus 
their main aims and daily work on calculating, planning, and investing their efforts and resources in 
exhibiting themselves successfully. Schools and their staff are pressured to devote their best efforts 
into satisfying external standards, criteria and tasks in order to produce a favorable and profitable 
image, thus creating the performing school.  
Ball (2001) asserts that there is a profound ‘process of exteriorization’, where “professional 
judgment is subordinated to the requirements of performativity and marketing” (p. 222). Individuals 
have to calculate, construct and advertise themselves in an efficient way and according to a 
predefined project of ‘excellence’. Institutions are pushed to be eager to compete, demonstrate ‘their 
best’, and position themselves favorably in comparison to others, shaping individuals into 
‘enterprising selves’ (Rose, 1992) and ‘greedy organizations’ (Blackmore & Sachs, 1997)16.  
Ball (2003) argues that these practices produce opacity and inauthenticity instead of the 
promised transparency and objectivity. It is, according to the author, a ‘paraphernalia of quality’ 
(1997, p. 260) and an ‘investment in plasticity’ (2003, p. 10). Teachers do not perform as they are; 
they perform in a way in which they suppose they will be positively judged. As Blackmore and Sachs 
(1997) point out: “Performativity is as much about being seen to perform—like a simulacrum in that 
the actual substance or original is lost” (original underline, sec.2). Schools and teachers, in Ball’s 
terms, ‘fabricate’ themselves in artificial ways, leaving aside the professional priorities and contextual 
needs. The effects of these occurrences are complex and profound. Anxiety, insecurity and guilt 
grow among school staff.  
We become ontologically insecure: unsure whether we are doing enough, doing the 
right thing, doing as much as others, or as well as others, constantly looking to 
improve, to be better, to be excellent. And yet it is not always very clear what is 
expected (Ball, 2003, p. 5). 
 
These policy effects are profound, “it changes who you are” (Ball, 2003, p. 215). However, 
these are not simple and linear changes; they produce intense professional and moral dilemmas, 
between market pressure, performance competition and cost-benefit norms, and, on the other hand, 
school members’ educational projects, professional criteria, contextual needs, and personal beliefs. It 
is a “struggle over the teacher’s soul” (Idem, p. 217).  
Final Thoughts 
Market and accountability policy combinations are shaping the performing school, as school 
staff must continuously compete, advertise and perform in order to assure a thriving institutional 
and professional future. The new policy model places schools within a competitive schema, altering 
school life and the teaching profession in profound ways. The studies reviewed, which look at inner 
school processes and changes using mostly qualitative and mixed-method studies, show that there is 
scant evidence of the expected benefits of these policies, such as continuous school improvement, 
educational innovation and diversity, and high standards for all. On the contrary, there is a growing 
body of studies carried out in different parts of the world that converge on similar results showing 
harmful consequences, such as: increasing use of an exam-led curriculum and a traditional 
pedagogical approach, rather than providing enriching, diverse and innovative learning experiences; 
                                                
16 See also Webb (2006) who, following a similar approach, studies the fabrications and the practices of pedagogic 
simulation in two ‘low-performing’ USA schools. 
The Performing School 17 
 
greater educational inequalities and social segregation between and within schools; management 
focus on marketing and visible results, employing ‘quick-fix’ thinking; and a decrease in school 
collaboration and teacher autonomy and participation.  
These changes are produced within a performative school ethos, as institutional practices and 
political rationales are shifting towards an instrumental-efficiency discourse and performative 
competition purposes, leaving aside comprehensive welfare ethics, and civic and community 
engagement. In effect, the enhancement of social justice matters, innovative and constructivist 
pedagogical approaches, and a democratic management style conflict with the dominant model. 
These educational aims act against an institution’s ability to compete in the market and acquire 
privileged positioning. 
This paper invites readers to rethink dominant policy doxai and to interrogate the market + 
accountability formula utopia for solving countries’ educational problems. In no case do I argue that 
public policies such as state standards, national tests and parental choice inherently bring damaging 
effects. The key issue is to study how these policy devices are laid out and combined in different 
settings. The problematic effects identified are not produced because of separate policies in isolated 
terms. It is the policy concatenation and interlocking functions between testing, dissemination of 
results, and institutional and individual awards/sanctions based on a market-led formula that 
generate harmful consequences for both school quality and equity.  
The literature review developed in this paper and the overall analytical understanding of the 
performing school provides arguments against scholars who have advocated that market solutions and 
high-stake tests bring greater provisional liberty, quality, diversity, and equity (see for e.g., Bruns, 
Filmer, & Patrinos, 2011; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2010; Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber 2010; 
Winkler, 2006). I do not discuss the specific data results of these mostly quantitative-based studies 
(for this debate see Dupriez & Dumay, 2011; Waslander, et al. 2010), yet I raise conceptual and 
empirical arguments from a different angle.     
I also interrogate the claims of authors that show problematic policy effects (e.g., ‘teaching 
to the test’), suggesting that these are ‘undesired consequences’ that vary among teachers, and 
depend on professionals’ commitments and abilities (see for e.g., Hamilton & Stecher, 2006; 
Hamilton et al., 2007; Koretz, 2005; Looney, 2009; Popham, 2002). Although the research findings 
converge with other critical reviewed studies, I question the interpretation of these results. These 
scholars neglect that schools' ‘unexpected responses’ are consistent and effective strategies for 
competing and surviving within the prevailing model. The authors place the problem at the 
individual level, and it is believed to be solved through emending ‘incorrect’ policy incentives; or 
from the perspective of school improvement theory, the policy matrix needs to move towards a 
‘balanced accountability’ (Hopkins, 2008, 2010) or a ‘positive pressure’ (Fullan, 2010). 
This previous analytical framework tends to separate the ideological nature of the policy and 
the ‘implementation problems’. From the critical perspective developed in this paper, the whole 
meaning of education, colonized by a neoliberal rational, must be rethought. It is fundamental to 
interpret the research findings addressing the meaning and implications of the market and 
accountability technologies and discourses that place schools within a hierarchical field, dominated 
by a competition-based logic. In this sense, I do not wish to take a deterministic perspective or to 
deny teachers’ agency. The research challenge is to understand how school members rework policies 
in the local sphere in both disciplinary and creative ways, and the ways in which individuals confront 
everyday tensions between market and state pressures, contextual needs, professional criteria and 
personal beliefs. 
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In terms of policy recommendations, devising solutions for low-performance and inequities 
in schools is undoubtedly a complex task.17 However on the basis of the research evidence I argue 
that the maintenance of today’s market and accountability policies will not solve these educational 
problems; on the contrary, they may intensify them. Although, the reduction of testing and sanction 
measures may lessen the ‘undesired effects’, this does not necessarily remove the competing 
paradigm that is at the heart of the studied model. 
From a more radical perspective, a holistic change is required that entails an alternative non-
competitive educational model that situates schools within a different philosophical and ethical 
paradigm. The policy horizon under this schema is comprehensive quality education for all, where 
market competition and rankings are removed. The suggestion is that state curriculum, assessment 
tools, and parental participation serve to support and improve schools, rather than working as 
market technologies for intensifying school differentiation and competition.  
Following Ranson (2003), the policy challenge is to shift the understanding of consumer-
performance accountability to communicational accountability in order to build a democratic public sphere 
within schools, enabling participation, open discussion, collective argumentation and decision-
making. From this perspective, schools are accountable to the public based on reciprocal engagement 
between institutions, professionals and the school community in general. The core issue here is the 
construction of trust and responsibility based on collaborative, critical and dialogical relationships 
among members of the school community. As Ranson (2003) writes: “responsibility is primarily a moral, 
not a technical or contractual notion, it both elicits and requires a felt and binding mutuality” (p. 700, my 
emphasis). 
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CHART 1: 
Comparison between Research Approaches that Study School Accountability Policies 
 
Research 
Approach 
Pro-Accountability School Improvement Critical Sociology of 
Education 
Research 
Objective 
Measures policy 
‘efficiency’, i.e. the impact 
of accountability policies 
on student test results.  
Studies the benefits and 
disadvantages of 
accountability policies over 
internal school improvement 
processes.  
Studies the effects of 
accountability policies among 
schools with different market 
reputation and student 
admission/selection practices. 
Analyses how these policies 
are practiced at the local level 
(‘micro-policy’).  
Research 
Focus 
Policy efficiency, test score 
increase, parental 
information and choice.  
The fortification of internal 
school improvement factors, 
such as instructional 
leadership, capacity building, 
and effective teaching 
practices.  
Critical analysis of neoliberal 
policies, special concern for 
social in/exclusion, 
democracy and 
transformations of public 
schooling. 
Methodolo-
gical  
strategies  
Quantitative studies, 
comparative studies 
between countries based 
on standardized test 
scores.  
Mixed quantitative and 
qualitative studies.  
Mostly qualitative studies 
(case studies and 
ethnographic studies). 
 
Vision of 
Market 
Policies 
Favorable or no reference 
to these policies. 
 
Ambiguous; these policies are 
usually considered less 
frequently. 
Critical vision, market and 
accountability policies are 
studied together. 
Main 
Findings 
Positive impact on student 
test scores; ‘secondary 
effects’ are recognized as 
an implementation 
problem.  
Over-testing and high stakes 
policies produce negative 
impact on school quality. If 
school management is robust 
and mature these effects are 
less marked or null.   
School-staff are tensioned by 
market/competition rational. 
Policy effects are 
transforming not only school 
practices, but also institutional 
values and ethics.   
Policy 
Recommen-
dations  
Pressure from both 
parents and the state 
(“double accountability”); 
improvement in parental 
information; amendment 
of negative incentives. 
External data must be 
complementary to internal 
data serving school 
improvement. 
Balance between professional 
development, support, & 
external pressure (‘intelligent’ 
or ‘balanced’ accountability).  
A holistic reform is required 
to remove competition 
mechanisms as the basis of 
the school system. 
Fortification of 
public/comprehensive 
schooling and local 
management.  
Theoretical 
Sources 
School Effectiveness 
Research, Rational Choice 
Theory 
School Improvement 
Research; Management 
Theory, Action Theory  
Post/ Critical sociology (e.g. 
Bourdieu, Buttler, Gramsci, 
Foucault) 
Examples of 
Authors 
Barber, Di Gropello, 
Mourshed, Woessmann, 
Winkler   
Darlind-Hammond, Fullan, 
Hargreaves, Hopkins, 
MacBeath, Mintrop 
Apple, Ball, Gewirtz, Lipman, 
Maroy, Ozga, Thrupp 
Authors’ own elaboration  
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